CVE-2026-16529

Description

A signed integer overflow in the PCP __pmGetPDU() function can be exploited via crafted network packets during PDU processing or SASL negotiation. This permanently blinds the affected daemon, resulting in a total denial of service (DoS) for subsequent packet reads.

Statement

This is an Important denial of service vulnerability in PCP due to a signed integer overflow. An unauthenticated remote attacker could exhaust resources by sending a specially crafted request to the pmlogger or pmcd services, leading to a permanent denial of service for the affected daemon. While both services are typically bound to the loopback interface by default, remote exploitation is possible if the default binding configuration is altered or if PMLOGGER_LOCAL is unset for pmlogger.

Mitigation

To mitigate this issue, ensure that Performance Co-Pilot (PCP) services, specifically `pmlogger` and `pmcd`, are not exposed to untrusted networks. By default, these services are configured to listen only on the loopback interface, which prevents remote exploitation. If these default network bindings have been altered, revert them to restrict access to localhost. For `pmlogger`, ensure the `PMLOGGER_LOCAL` environment variable is set. If remote access to PCP services is not required, consider implementing firewall rules to block external connections to TCP ports 4330 (pmlogger) and 44321 (pmcd). Changes to network configurations or environment variables may require restarting the affected PCP services for the mitigation to take effect.

Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Score Details

Info alert:Important note

CVSS scores for open source components depend on vendor-specific factors (e.g. version or build chain). Therefore, Red Hat's score and impact rating can be different from NVD and other vendors. Red Hat remains the authoritative CVE Naming Authority (CNA) source for its products and services (see Red Hat classifications).

CVSS v3 Score Breakdown

Red HatNVDcve.org
Base Score7.5N/A7.5
Attack VectorNetworkN/ANetwork
Attack ComplexityLowN/ALow
Privileges RequiredNoneN/ANone
User InteractionNoneN/ANone
ScopeUnchangedN/AUnchanged
ConfidentialityNoneN/ANone
Integrity ImpactNoneN/ANone
Availability ImpactHighN/AHigh

Vector

Red Hat: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

cve.org: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Understanding the Weakness (CWE)

Availability

Technical Impact: DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Instability

This weakness can generally lead to undefined behavior and therefore crashes. When the calculated result is used for resource allocation, this weakness can cause too many (or too few) resources to be allocated, possibly enabling crashes if the product requests more resources than can be provided.

Integrity

Technical Impact: Modify Memory

If the value in question is important to data (as opposed to flow), simple data corruption has occurred. Also, if the overflow/wraparound results in other conditions such as buffer overflows, further memory corruption may occur.

Confidentiality,Availability,Access Control

Technical Impact: Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism

This weakness can sometimes trigger buffer overflows, which can be used to execute arbitrary code. This is usually outside the scope of the product's implicit security policy.

Availability,Other

Technical Impact: Alter Execution Logic; DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

If the overflow/wraparound occurs in a loop index variable, this could cause the loop to terminate at the wrong time - too early, too late, or not at all (i.e., infinite loops). With too many iterations, some loops could consume too many resources such as memory, file handles, etc., possibly leading to a crash or other DoS.

Access Control

Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism

If integer values are used in security-critical decisions, such as calculating quotas or allocation limits, integer overflows can be used to cause an incorrect security decision.

Acknowledgements

Red Hat would like to thank Francisco Alisson Bezerra (TIM Security Red Team Research, TIM S.p.A), Lucas Gabriel Alves (TIM Security Red Team Research, TIM S.p.A), and Massimiliano Brolli (TIM Security Red Team Research, TIM S.p.A) for reporting this issue.

Frequently Asked Questions

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