CVE-2026-85769
Description
A flaw was found in libtpms, a library that provides software TPM 2.0 emulation. When restoring TPM 2.0 state (for example during a virtual machine's power-on or state/migration restore), a malformed state blob can supply an oversized skip-block length that is not validated against the remaining size of the input buffer. This can drive an internal size counter negative, which bypasses a subsequent bounds check due to an unsafe signed-to-unsigned conversion, causing the parser to read memory outside the bounds of the heap buffer holding the state data. Successful exploitation can crash the process hosting libtpms (such as swtpm), resulting in a denial of service of the emulated TPM device and the virtual machine that depends on it. No data corruption or information disclosure was confirmed.
Statement
This vulnerability is rated as Moderate because exploitation results in a denial of service (crash or forced TPM failure mode) via a heap out-of-bounds read, with no confirmed information disclosure or code execution path. The flaw affects builds of libtpms compiled with TPM 2.0 support (--with-tpm2, the default). The vulnerable code is in the TPM 2.0 state (de)serializer and is not present in TPM 1.2-only builds. Products that ship libtpms with TPM 2.0 support (used to provide virtual TPM 2.0 devices to guests via swtpm/QEMU) are affected. Practical exposure depends on whether an attacker can supply or tamper with the TPM state blob passed to TPMLIB_SetState(); in swtpm-based VM migration scenarios this may include a trust boundary between cooperating hypervisor hosts. Red Hat product-to-component mapping is required to confirm exact shipped configurations.
Mitigation
No mitigation is currently available that meets Red Hat Product Security's standards for usability, deployment, applicability, or stability.
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Score Details
Info alert:Important note
CVSS scores for open source components depend on vendor-specific factors (e.g. version or build chain). Therefore, Red Hat's score and impact rating can be different from NVD and other vendors. Red Hat remains the authoritative CVE Naming Authority (CNA) source for its products and services (see Red Hat classifications).
The following CVSS metrics and score provided are preliminary and subject to review.
CVSS v3 Score Breakdown
| Red Hat | NVD | cve.org | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Score | 6.5 | N/A | 6.5 |
| Attack Vector | Adjacent Network | N/A | Adjacent Network |
| Attack Complexity | Low | N/A | Low |
| Privileges Required | None | N/A | None |
| User Interaction | None | N/A | None |
| Scope | Unchanged | N/A | Unchanged |
| Confidentiality | None | N/A | None |
| Integrity Impact | None | N/A | None |
| Availability Impact | High | N/A | High |
Vector
Red Hat: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
cve.org: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Red Hat CVSS v3 Score Explanation
Independent assessment: heap OOB read via TPM 2.0 state blob deserialization; AV:A for documented swtpm migration path; PR:N (no auth check on blob content in libtpms); DoS only (C:N/I:N).
Understanding the Weakness (CWE)
Confidentiality
Technical Impact: Read Memory
An attacker could get secret values such as cryptographic keys, PII, memory addresses, or other information that could be used in additional attacks.
Confidentiality
Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism
Out-of-bounds memory could contain memory addresses or other information that can be used to bypass ASLR and other protection mechanisms in order to improve the reliability of exploiting a separate weakness for code execution.
Availability
Technical Impact: DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
An attacker could cause a segmentation fault or crash by causing memory to be read outside of the bounds of the buffer. This is especially likely when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string.
Other
Technical Impact: Varies by Context
The read operation could produce other undefined or unexpected results.
Acknowledgements
Red Hat would like to thank Isuka Sanuj (株式会社CyberCrew) for reporting this issue.
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