CVE-2026-122266
Description
A flaw was found in aws-network-policy-agent. Due to improper isolation of shared connection tracking data, an authenticated attacker operating on the same host node can poison shared network tracking state using crafted raw network frames. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass ingress network policy restrictions, resulting in unauthorized network communication with co-located pods.
Statement
This vulnerability is rated as Important because an authenticated adjacent attacker on the same node can break cross-pod network isolation boundaries across tenant scopes. Red Hat OpenShift platforms rely on native networking plugins such as OVN-Kubernetes rather than the AWS Network Policy Agent. Consequently, standard Red Hat environments are not affected by this vulnerability unless custom or unmanaged Amazon VPC CNI add-ons are running on the cluster.
Mitigation
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-06) ---
Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.
The highest-value action is to drop CAP_NET_RAW and restrict AF_PACKET raw socket creation across pods to prevent injecting crafted frames into aws-network-policy-agent shared eBPF conntrack maps: upgrade to aws-network-policy-agent 1.3.7+ (Amazon VPC CNI 1.22.3+), which enforces proper isolation of shared eBPF connection tracking state across pods to block conntrack table poisoning, closing all 2 injection vectors (eBPF conntrack map poisoning via crafted AF_PACKET frames, crafted raw network frames across co-located pod namespaces). Until patched, this is only a concern on Linux hosts running Amazon EKS with aws-network-policy-agent enabled — standard Red Hat OpenShift clusters using native plugins like OVN-Kubernetes are unaffected — so audit and strip CAP_NET_RAW capabilities from untrusted workloads and prevent co-located pods from opening raw AF_PACKET sockets on the same host nodes. As a compensating measure, monitor with Falco or eBPF runtime security to detect unauthorized AF_PACKET raw socket creation and lateral network activity, apply kernel-level seccomp filters to block socket creation using AF_PACKET, sandbox container network stacks with gVisor to isolate workloads from the host eBPF conntrack table, and enforce admission controller policies to reject pods requesting CAP_NET_RAW or privileged networking modes. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying improper resource isolation defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
Highest-impact CME: CME-705 Dropped Linux Capabilities (high)
Understanding the Weakness (CWE)
Access Control
Technical Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism
The exploitation of a weakness in low-privileged areas of the software can be leveraged to reach higher-privileged areas without having to overcome any additional obstacles, extending the scope of the damage to higher-privileged users..
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