CVE-2026-113723

--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) ---
Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.

The highest-value action is to sanitize caller-supplied prompt text and avoid unquoted command substitution during PS1 assignment in virtualenv POSIX activation scripts: upgrade to virtualenv 21.14.9 (or the fixed Uv/Rhoai/Odh Kserve Agent Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Kserve Controller Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Kserve Router Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Kserve Storage Initializer Rhel/Python Virtualenv/Rhoai/Odh Feature Server Rhel/Python3.11 Virtualenv/Python3.12 Virtualenv/Devspaces/Udi Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Ta Lmes Job Rhel/Cloudservices/Advisor Backend/Satellite/Iop Host Inventory Rhel/Satellite/Iop Yuptoo Rhel/Ansible Automation Platform 26/Lightspeed Chatbot Rhel/Satellite/Iop Advisor Backend Rhel/Ansible Automation Platform 26/Controller Rhel/Ansible Automation Platform 27/Controller Rhel/Ansible Ai Connect Service/Insights Host Inventory/Rhoai/Odh Training Rocm64 Torch28 Py312 Rhel/Cloudservices/Ros Backend/Redhat User Workloads/Mintmaker Renovate Image/Koku Daily/Nise Populator/Openshift Lightspeed/Lightspeed Service Api Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Trustyai Nemo Guardrails Server Rhel/Ansible Chatbot Stack/Rhoai/Odh Workbench Codeserver Datascience Cpu Py312 Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Workbench Jupyter Datascience Cpu Py312 Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Workbench Jupyter Pytorch Llmcompressor Cuda Py312 Rhel/Cloudservices/Rbac/Cloudservices/Yuptoo/Rhel Cla/Rlsapi Rhel/Rhai Early Access/Docling Serve Cuda Rhel/Digital Roadmap Backend/Ansible Automation Platform 27/Eda Controller Rhel/Automation Hub Container/Ansible Automation Platform 26/Eda Controller Rhel/Vulnerability Engine builds), which restrict PS1 modification to bash and zsh, reference prompt values via literal parameter expansion to prevent re-evaluation, and leave PS1 unchanged in other POSIX shells, closing all 2 injection vectors (crafted prompt text, crafted destination directory name). Until patched, this is a concern on Linux systems where virtual environment activation scripts are sourced in POSIX shells, so Set VIRTUAL_ENV_DISABLE_PROMPT=1 in the environment and prohibit sourcing virtualenv activation scripts created from untrusted prompt text or directory paths. As a compensating measure, Configure auditd to record execve syscalls and process execution triggered by evaluating command substitution in the bash prompt, Run SELinux in enforcing mode to confine the process domain and restrict resources accessible to commands executed via prompt expansion, Apply SELinux confined user mappings to bound the privileges and reachable file domains of the user session executing the activation script, Deploy an EDR agent to detect anomalous child processes spawned from bash when the activation script is sourced, and Use Falco eBPF runtime monitoring to detect unexpected interactive shells or anomalous processes spawned during virtual environment activation. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying shell command injection defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.

Highest-impact CME: CME-1307 Command Injection Prevention (No Shell Invocation) (high)