CVE-2026-107935

This issue is rated as having an Important security impact rather than Critical because successful exploitation requires the attacker to already be able to execute code inside the guest virtual machine or a container running within it, for example by convincing a user to run a malicious or compromised container image. The vulnerable /services/forwarder/expose endpoint is only reachable from the internal virtual-network gateway (the guest's default route) and is not exposed to external networks or to the host itself. The impact is bounded by the privileges of the unprivileged user account under which gvproxy runs: the flaw permits destruction and socket-squatting of files owned by that user, but does not by itself provide arbitrary code execution or privilege escalation on the host.

Red Hat Build of Podman Desktop bundles the affected gvisor-tap-vsock (gvproxy) component and is therefore affected. The flaw was addressed in gvisor-tap-vsock 0.9.0 by removing the os.Remove() call from the forwarder's Unix-socket code path; as a result, a pre-existing host file can no longer be deleted or overwritten, because listening on the socket now fails if a file already exists at the requested path.