CVE-2025-68183

Description

From CVE.org

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in security.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the file. For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima, installing/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated, # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash # file: usr/bin/bash security.ima=0x0404... This happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated when the file is closed. Similarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing security xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL. Prevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing the IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset. Here's a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last step which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL, #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> int main() { const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary"; const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304"; int length = strlen(hex_string); char* ima_attr_value; int fd; fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644); if (fd == -1) { perror("Error opening file"); return 1; } ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 ); for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) { sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]); } if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0"; if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } close(fd); return 0; }

Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Score Details

Info alert:Important note

CVSS scores for open source components depend on vendor-specific factors (e.g. version or build chain). Therefore, Red Hat's score and impact rating can be different from NVD and other vendors. Red Hat remains the authoritative CVE Naming Authority (CNA) source for its products and services (see Red Hat classifications).

CVSS v3 Score Breakdown

Red HatNVDcve.org
Base Score7.1N/A7.8
Attack VectorLocalN/ALocal
Attack ComplexityLowN/ALow
Privileges RequiredLowN/ALow
User InteractionNoneN/ANone
ScopeUnchangedN/AUnchanged
ConfidentialityHighN/AHigh
Integrity ImpactNoneN/AHigh
Availability ImpactHighN/AHigh

Vector

Red Hat: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

cve.org: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Understanding the Weakness (CWE)

Integrity,Other

Technical Impact: Modify Application Data; Other

Integrity checks usually use a secret key that helps authenticate the data origin. Skipping integrity checking generally opens up the possibility that new data from an invalid source can be injected.

Integrity,Other

Technical Impact: Other

Data that is parsed and used may be corrupted.

Non-Repudiation,Other

Technical Impact: Hide Activities; Other

Without a checksum check, it is impossible to determine if any changes have been made to the data after it was sent.

Frequently Asked Questions

Want to get errata notifications? Sign up here.