CVE-2023-53509
Description
From CVE.org
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: qed: allow sleep in qed_mcp_trace_dump() By default, qed_mcp_cmd_and_union() delays 10us at a time in a loop that can run 500K times, so calls to qed_mcp_nvm_rd_cmd() may block the current thread for over 5s. We observed thread scheduling delays over 700ms in production, with stacktraces pointing to this code as the culprit. qed_mcp_trace_dump() is called from ethtool, so sleeping is permitted. It already can sleep in qed_mcp_halt(), which calls qed_mcp_cmd(). Add a "can sleep" parameter to qed_find_nvram_image() and qed_nvram_read() so they can sleep during qed_mcp_trace_dump(). qed_mcp_trace_get_meta_info() and qed_mcp_trace_read_meta(), called only by qed_mcp_trace_dump(), allow these functions to sleep. I can't tell if the other caller (qed_grc_dump_mcp_hw_dump()) can sleep, so keep b_can_sleep set to false when it calls these functions. An example stacktrace from a custom warning we added to the kernel showing a thread that has not scheduled despite long needing resched: [ 2745.362925,17] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2745.362941,17] WARNING: CPU: 23 PID: 5640 at arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:233 do_IRQ+0x15e/0x1a0() [ 2745.362946,17] Thread not rescheduled for 744 ms after irq 99 [ 2745.362956,17] Modules linked in: ... [ 2745.363339,17] CPU: 23 PID: 5640 Comm: lldpd Tainted: P O 4.4.182+ #202104120910+6d1da174272d.61x [ 2745.363343,17] Hardware name: FOXCONN MercuryB/Quicksilver Controller, BIOS H11P1N09 07/08/2020 [ 2745.363346,17] 0000000000000000 ffff885ec07c3ed8 ffffffff8131eb2f ffff885ec07c3f20 [ 2745.363358,17] ffffffff81d14f64 ffff885ec07c3f10 ffffffff81072ac2 ffff88be98ed0000 [ 2745.363369,17] 0000000000000063 0000000000000174 0000000000000074 0000000000000000 [ 2745.363379,17] Call Trace: [ 2745.363382,17] <IRQ> [<ffffffff8131eb2f>] dump_stack+0x8e/0xcf [ 2745.363393,17] [<ffffffff81072ac2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0 [ 2745.363398,17] [<ffffffff81072b4c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4c/0x50 [ 2745.363404,17] [<ffffffff810d5a8e>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0xae/0xc0 [ 2745.363408,17] [<ffffffff817c99fe>] do_IRQ+0x15e/0x1a0 [ 2745.363413,17] [<ffffffff817c7ac9>] common_interrupt+0x89/0x89 [ 2745.363416,17] <EOI> [<ffffffff8132aa74>] ? delay_tsc+0x24/0x50 [ 2745.363425,17] [<ffffffff8132aa04>] __udelay+0x34/0x40 [ 2745.363457,17] [<ffffffffa04d45ff>] qed_mcp_cmd_and_union+0x36f/0x7d0 [qed] [ 2745.363473,17] [<ffffffffa04d5ced>] qed_mcp_nvm_rd_cmd+0x4d/0x90 [qed] [ 2745.363490,17] [<ffffffffa04e1dc7>] qed_mcp_trace_dump+0x4a7/0x630 [qed] [ 2745.363504,17] [<ffffffffa04e2556>] ? qed_fw_asserts_dump+0x1d6/0x1f0 [qed] [ 2745.363520,17] [<ffffffffa04e4ea7>] qed_dbg_mcp_trace_get_dump_buf_size+0x37/0x80 [qed] [ 2745.363536,17] [<ffffffffa04ea881>] qed_dbg_feature_size+0x61/0xa0 [qed] [ 2745.363551,17] [<ffffffffa04eb427>] qed_dbg_all_data_size+0x247/0x260 [qed] [ 2745.363560,17] [<ffffffffa0482c10>] qede_get_regs_len+0x30/0x40 [qede] [ 2745.363566,17] [<ffffffff816c9783>] ethtool_get_drvinfo+0xe3/0x190 [ 2745.363570,17] [<ffffffff816cc152>] dev_ethtool+0x1362/0x2140 [ 2745.363575,17] [<ffffffff8109bcc6>] ? finish_task_switch+0x76/0x260 [ 2745.363580,17] [<ffffffff817c2116>] ? __schedule+0x3c6/0x9d0 [ 2745.363585,17] [<ffffffff810dbd50>] ? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x1d0/0x370 [ 2745.363589,17] [<ffffffff816c1e5b>] ? dev_get_by_name_rcu+0x6b/0x90 [ 2745.363594,17] [<ffffffff816de6a8>] dev_ioctl+0xe8/0x710 [ 2745.363599,17] [<ffffffff816a58a8>] sock_do_ioctl+0x48/0x60 [ 2745.363603,17] [<ffffffff816a5d87>] sock_ioctl+0x1c7/0x280 [ 2745.363608,17] [<ffffffff8111f393>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x83/0x220 [ 2745.363612,17] [<ffffffff811e3503>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x2b3/0x4e0 [ 2745.363616,17] [<ffffffff811e3771>] SyS_ioctl+0x41/0x70 [ 2745.363619,17] [<ffffffff817c6ffe>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x79 [ 2745.363622,17] ---[ end trace f6954aa440266421 ]---
Statement
The patch lets the QED debug/trace dump path sleep instead of spinning in tight udelay loops when reading large MCP/NVRAM blobs, eliminating seconds-long CPU busy-wait and scheduler stalls observed from the ethtool path. Impact: availability only (temporary CPU starvation / long scheduling latency). For the CVSS the PR:H, because in typical deployments, collecting such debug traces via ethtool is gated or practically used by administrators.
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Score Details
Info alert:Important note
CVSS scores for open source components depend on vendor-specific factors (e.g. version or build chain). Therefore, Red Hat's score and impact rating can be different from NVD and other vendors. Red Hat remains the authoritative CVE Naming Authority (CNA) source for its products and services (see Red Hat classifications).
The following CVSS metrics and score provided are preliminary and subject to review.
CVSS v3 Score Breakdown
| Red Hat | NVD | cve.org | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Score | 4.4 | 5.5 | N/A |
| Attack Vector | Local | Local | N/A |
| Attack Complexity | Low | Low | N/A |
| Privileges Required | High | Low | N/A |
| User Interaction | None | None | N/A |
| Scope | Unchanged | Unchanged | N/A |
| Confidentiality | None | None | N/A |
| Integrity Impact | None | None | N/A |
| Availability Impact | High | High | N/A |
Vector
Red Hat: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
NVD: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Understanding the Weakness (CWE)
Availability
Technical Impact: DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)
If an attacker can trigger the allocation of the limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the most common result is denial of service. This would prevent valid users from accessing the product, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment, i.e., the product may slow down, crash due to unhandled errors, or lock out legitimate users. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
Access Control,Other
Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other
In some cases it may be possible to force the product to "fail open" in the event of resource exhaustion. The state of the product -- and possibly the security functionality - may then be compromised.
Frequently Asked Questions
Not sure what something means? Check out our Security Glossary.
Want to get errata notifications? Sign up here.