CVE-2022-1434
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Description
The CVE Program describes this issue as:
The OpenSSL 3.0 implementation of the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite incorrectly uses the AAD data as the MAC key. This makes the MAC key trivially predictable. An attacker could exploit this issue by performing a man-in-the-middle attack to modify data being sent from one endpoint to an OpenSSL 3.0 recipient such that the modified data would still pass the MAC integrity check. Note that data sent from an OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint to a non-OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint will always be rejected by the recipient and the connection will fail at that point. Many application protocols require data to be sent from the client to the server first. Therefore, in such a case, only an OpenSSL 3.0 server would be impacted when talking to a non-OpenSSL 3.0 client. If both endpoints are OpenSSL 3.0 then the attacker could modify data being sent in both directions. In this case both clients and servers could be affected, regardless of the application protocol. Note that in the absence of an attacker this bug means that an OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint communicating with a non-OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint will fail to complete the handshake when using this ciphersuite. The confidentiality of data is not impacted by this issue, i.e. an attacker cannot decrypt data that has been encrypted using this ciphersuite - they can only modify it. In order for this attack to work both endpoints must legitimately negotiate the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite. This ciphersuite is not compiled by default in OpenSSL 3.0, and is not available within the default provider or the default ciphersuite list. This ciphersuite will never be used if TLSv1.3 has been negotiated. In order for an OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint to use this ciphersuite the following must have occurred: 1) OpenSSL must have been compiled with the (non-default) compile time option enable-weak-ssl-ciphers 2) OpenSSL must have had the legacy provider explicitly loaded (either through application code or via configuration) 3) The ciphersuite must have been explicitly added to the ciphersuite list 4) The libssl security level must have been set to 0 (default is 1) 5) A version of SSL/TLS below TLSv1.3 must have been negotiated 6) Both endpoints must negotiate the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite in preference to any others that both endpoints have in common Fixed in OpenSSL 3.0.3 (Affected 3.0.0,3.0.1,3.0.2).
Statement
This flaw does not affect openssl as shipped in Red Hat Enterprise Linux because the vulnerable code is not built and shipped.
Additional information
- Bugzilla 2087912: openssl: Incorrect MAC key used in the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite
- CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
- FAQ: Frequently asked questions about CVE-2022-1434
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Score Details
Important note
CVSS scores for open source components depend on vendor-specific factors (e.g. version or build chain). Therefore, Red Hat's score and impact rating can be different from NVD and other vendors. Red Hat remains the authoritative CVE Naming Authority (CNA) source for its products and services (see Red Hat classifications).
The following CVSS metrics and score provided are preliminary and subject to review.
Red Hat | NVD | |
---|---|---|
CVSS v3 Base Score | 5.9 | 5.9 |
Attack Vector | Network | Network |
Attack Complexity | High | High |
Privileges Required | None | None |
User Interaction | None | None |
Scope | Unchanged | Unchanged |
Confidentiality Impact | None | None |
Integrity Impact | High | High |
Availability Impact | None | None |
CVSS v3 Vector
Red Hat: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
NVD: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Frequently Asked Questions
Why is Red Hat's CVSS v3 score or Impact different from other vendors?
For more information, see https://access.redhat.com/solutions/762393.
My product is listed as "Under investigation" or "Affected", when will Red Hat release a fix for this vulnerability?
- "Under investigation" doesn't necessarily mean that the product is affected by this vulnerability. It only means that our Analysis Team is still working on determining whether the product is affected and how it is affected.
- The term "Affected" means that our Analysis team has determined that this product, such as Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 or OpenShift Container Platform 4, is affected by this vulnerability and a fix may be released to address this issue in the near future. This includes all minor releases of this product unless noted otherwise in the Statement text.
What can I do if my product is listed as "Will not fix"?
Available options depend mostly on the Impact of the vulnerability and the current Life Cycle phase of your product. Overall, you have the following options:
- Upgrade to a supported product version that includes a fix for this vulnerability (recommended).
- Apply a mitigation (if one exists).
- Open a support case to request a prioritization of releasing a fix for this vulnerability.
What can I do if my product is listed as "Fix deferred"?
Available options depend mostly on the Impact of the vulnerability and the current Life Cycle phase of your product. Overall, you have the following options:
- Apply a mitigation (if one exists).
- Open a support case to request a prioritization of releasing a fix for this vulnerability.
- Red Hat Engineering focuses on addressing high-priority issues based on their complexity or limited lifecycle support. Therefore, lower-priority issues will not receive immediate fixes.
What is a mitigation?
I have a Red Hat product but it is not in the above list, is it affected?
Why is my security scanner reporting my product as vulnerable to this vulnerability even though my product version is fixed or not affected?
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