<Vulnerability name="CVE-2026-46726">
    <DocumentDistribution xml:lang="en">Copyright © 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.</DocumentDistribution>
    <ThreatSeverity>Important</ThreatSeverity>
    <PublicDate>2026-07-06T08:05:40</PublicDate>
    <Bugzilla id="2497287" url="https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2497287" xml:lang="en:us">
camel-vertx-websocket: Apache Camel Vertx Websocket: Server-Side Request Forgery and sensitive data exposure
    </Bugzilla>
    <CVSS3 status="draft">
        <CVSS3BaseScore>8.2</CVSS3BaseScore>
        <CVSS3ScoringVector>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N</CVSS3ScoringVector>
    </CVSS3>
    <CWE>CWE-918</CWE>
    <Details xml:lang="en:us" source="Mitre">
Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in Vertx Websocket component.

The camel-vertx-websocket consumer mapped inbound WebSocket query and path parameters into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy (VertxWebsocketConsumer.populateExchangeHeaders()). Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, a client connecting to the WebSocket endpoint could set Camel-internal control headers - including CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them as query parameters. In a route where the WebSocket consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request to an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting (attacker-controlled) URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - such as an environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault reference - are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, disclosing environment variables, application properties and vault secrets. When the WebSocket endpoint is exposed without authentication, this is reachable by an unauthenticated remote attacker.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes the affected consumers apply a HeaderFilterStrategy that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound message before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), require authentication on the WebSocket endpoint, and avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers.
    </Details>
    <Details xml:lang="en:us" source="Red Hat">
A flaw was found in the Apache Camel Vertx Websocket component. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to inject malicious query parameters into a WebSocket connection. This can lead to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the server is coerced into making requests to arbitrary internal or external destinations. Additionally, the flaw can result in the disclosure of sensitive information, including environment variables, application properties, and vault secrets.
    </Details>
    <Statement xml:lang="en:us">
A flaw was found in the Apache Camel Vertx-WebSocket component. The WebSocket consumer copies inbound query and path parameters into the Camel Exchange header map without applying a HeaderFilterStrategy. An attacker can inject Camel-internal control headers (such as CamelHttpUri) via WebSocket query parameters, causing SSRF when routed to an HTTP producer. The HTTP producer also resolves Camel property placeholders on the attacker-controlled URI, leaking environment variables, application properties, and vault secrets. Red Hat builds of Apache Camel for Spring Boot and Quarkus ship the affected camel-vertx-websocket component.
    </Statement>
    <Mitigation xml:lang="en:us">
Restrict access to exposed WebSocket endpoints with authentication. If unable to upgrade, strip Camel-internal headers from inbound WebSocket messages before they reach downstream producers (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route).
    </Mitigation>
    <PackageState cpe="cpe:/a:redhat:camel_quarkus:3">
        <ProductName>Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3</ProductName>
        <FixState>Affected</FixState>
        <PackageName>camel-vertx-websocket</PackageName>
    </PackageState>
    <PackageState cpe="cpe:/a:redhat:camel_spring_boot:4">
        <ProductName>Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4</ProductName>
        <FixState>Affected</FixState>
        <PackageName>camel-vertx-websocket</PackageName>
    </PackageState>
    <References xml:lang="en:us">
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46726
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46726
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46726.html
    </References>
</Vulnerability>