<Vulnerability name="CVE-2026-46584">
    <DocumentDistribution xml:lang="en">Copyright © 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.</DocumentDistribution>
    <ThreatSeverity>Moderate</ThreatSeverity>
    <PublicDate>2026-07-06T08:02:37</PublicDate>
    <Bugzilla id="2497288" url="https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2497288" xml:lang="en:us">
org.apache.camel/camel-mail: Apache Camel Mail Component: Credential exposure and information disclosure via improper input validation of mail headers
    </Bugzilla>
    <CVSS3 status="verified">
        <CVSS3BaseScore>7.5</CVSS3BaseScore>
        <CVSS3ScoringVector>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N</CVSS3ScoringVector>
    </CVSS3>
    <CWE>CWE-918</CWE>
    <Details xml:lang="en:us" source="Mitre">
Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Camel Mail Component.

The camel-mail producer (MailProducer.getSender) scanned the outgoing Exchange for message headers in the mail.smtp. / mail.smtps. namespace and, when any were present, built a per-message JavaMail sender with those values applied as JavaMail session properties, overriding the endpoint configuration. This namespace is Camel-internal - only MailProducer interprets it - and was not blocked by any HeaderFilterStrategy, so the values could originate from any inbound protocol (for example platform-http query parameters or request headers, or JMS / Kafka messages from untrusted producers) that feeds a route ending in an smtp / smtps producer without an intervening removeHeaders. The maximal impact is version-dependent: on releases before 4.19.0, setting mail.smtp.host redirects the SMTP connection to a server under the attacker's control, and because the producer then authenticates with the endpoint's configured username and password those credentials are transmitted to the attacker; on 4.19.0 and later the producer connects to the endpoint's configured host explicitly, so the reachable impact is limited to weakening transport security (for example mail.smtp.ssl.trust, mail.smtp.starttls.enable or mail.smtp.socks.host) and interception of the outgoing message rather than host redirect. Exploitation requires a route that channels untrusted input into the mail producer without stripping the namespace.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, the per-message override is disabled by default; enable it only on trusted endpoints with useJavaMailSessionPropertiesFromHeaders=true. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the namespace before the mail producer with removeHeaders('mail.smtp.*') and removeHeaders('mail.smtps.*') between any untrusted ingress and the smtp / smtps producer. Even with the opt-in enabled, route authors should still strip the namespace on any path that carries untrusted input.
    </Details>
    <Details xml:lang="en:us" source="Red Hat">
A flaw was found in the Apache Camel Mail Component. This vulnerability, due to improper input validation, allows a remote attacker to exploit routes that channel untrusted input into the mail producer without proper header stripping. Before version 4.19.0, this could lead to the redirection of SMTP connections to an attacker-controlled server, exposing user credentials. In later versions, the impact is limited to weakening transport security and intercepting outgoing messages, potentially leading to information disclosure.
    </Details>
    <Statement xml:lang="en:us">
This Moderate impact flaw in the Apache Camel Mail Component arises from improper input validation, allowing remote attackers to exploit routes that channel untrusted input into the mail producer without explicit header stripping. Depending on the Apache Camel version, this could lead to credential exposure by redirecting SMTP connections to an attacker-controlled server or, in newer versions, to the weakening of transport security and interception of outgoing messages. Exploitation is contingent on the application's routing configuration.
    </Statement>
    <Mitigation xml:lang="en:us">
To mitigate this vulnerability, ensure that any Camel routes processing untrusted input and forwarding it to the mail producer explicitly strip the `mail.smtp.*` and `mail.smtps.*` header namespaces. This can be achieved by adding `removeHeaders('mail.smtp.*')` and `removeHeaders('mail.smtps.*')` to the route definition between the untrusted ingress and the SMTP/SMTPS producer.
    </Mitigation>
    <AffectedRelease cpe="cpe:/a:redhat:apache_camel_quarkus:3.33">
        <ProductName>Red Hat Build of Apache Camel 4.18 for Quarkus 3.33</ProductName>
        <ReleaseDate>2026-07-30T00:00:00Z</ReleaseDate>
        <Advisory type="RHSA" url="https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:48118">RHSA-2026:48118</Advisory>
        <Package name="camel-mail">camel-mail</Package>
    </AffectedRelease>
    <PackageState cpe="cpe:/a:redhat:camel_quarkus:3">
        <ProductName>Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3</ProductName>
        <FixState>Affected</FixState>
        <PackageName>camel-mail</PackageName>
    </PackageState>
    <PackageState cpe="cpe:/a:redhat:camel_spring_boot:4">
        <ProductName>Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4</ProductName>
        <FixState>Affected</FixState>
        <PackageName>camel-mail</PackageName>
    </PackageState>
    <PackageState cpe="cpe:/a:redhat:jbosseapxp">
        <ProductName>Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack</ProductName>
        <FixState>Not affected</FixState>
        <PackageName>camel-mail</PackageName>
    </PackageState>
    <References xml:lang="en:us">
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46584
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46584
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46584.html
    </References>
</Vulnerability>