In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lib/crypto: chacha: Zeroize permuted_state before it leaves scope Since the ChaCha permutation is invertible, the local variable 'permuted_state' is sufficient to compute the original 'state', and thus the key, even after the permutation has been done. While the kernel is quite inconsistent about zeroizing secrets on the stack (and some prominent userspace crypto libraries don't bother at all since it's not guaranteed to work anyway), the kernel does try to do it as a best practice, especially in cases involving the RNG. Thus, explicitly zeroize 'permuted_state' before it goes out of scope.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's ChaCha cryptographic algorithm implementation. The `permuted_state` local variable, which is sufficient to compute the original cryptographic key, was not properly zeroized before leaving its scope. This oversight could allow an attacker to recover the cryptographic key, leading to information disclosure.

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 Not affected kernel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Not affected kernel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Not affected kernel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Not affected kernel-rt Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Not affected kernel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Not affected kernel-rt Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 Not affected kernel Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 Not affected kernel-rt https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-43336 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43336 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git/plain/cve/published/2026/CVE-2026-43336.mbox