Red Hat OpenStack Platform 16.2

Manage Secrets with OpenStack Key Manager

How to integrate OpenStack Key Manager (Barbican) with your OpenStack deployment.
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How to integrate OpenStack Key Manager (Barbican) with your OpenStack deployment.

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Abstract

How to integrate OpenStack Key Manager (Barbican) with your OpenStack deployment.
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MAKING OPEN SOURCE MORE INCLUSIVE

Red Hat is committed to replacing problematic language in our code, documentation, and web properties. We are beginning with these four terms: master, slave, blacklist, and whitelist. Because of the enormity of this endeavor, these changes will be implemented gradually over several upcoming releases. For more details, see our CTO Chris Wright’s message.
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CHAPTER 1. DEPLOYING AND CONFIGURING OPENSTACK KEY MANAGER (BARBICAN)

OpenStack Key Manager (barbican) is the secrets manager for Red Hat OpenStack Platform. You can use the barbican API and command line to centrally manage the certificates, keys, and passwords used by OpenStack services. Barbican is not enabled by default in Red Hat OpenStack Platform. You can deploy barbican in an existing OpenStack deployment.

Barbican currently supports the following use cases described in this guide:

- **Symmetric encryption keys** - used for Block Storage (cinder) volume encryption, ephemeral disk encryption, and Object Storage (swift) encryption, among others.

- **Asymmetric keys and certificates** - used for glance image signing and verification, among others.

OpenStack Key Manager integrates with the Block Storage (cinder), Networking (neutron), and Compute (nova) components.

1.1. OPENSTACK KEY MANAGER WORKFLOW

The following diagram shows the workflow that OpenStack Key Manager uses to manage secrets for your environment.
1.2. OPENSTACK KEY MANAGER ENCRYPTION TYPES

Secrets such as certificates, API keys, and passwords, can be stored in an encrypted blob in the barbican.
Secrets such as certificates, API keys, and passwords, can be stored in an encrypted blob in the barbican database or directly in a secure storage system. You can use a simple crypto plugin or PKCS#11 crypto plugin to encrypt secrets.

To store the secrets as an encrypted blob in the barbican database, the following options are available:

- **Simple crypto plugin** - The simple crypto plugin is enabled by default and uses a single symmetric key to encrypt all secret payloads. This key is stored in plain text in the `barbican.conf` file, so it is important to prevent unauthorized access to this file.

- **PKCS#11 crypto plugin** - The PKCS#11 crypto plugin encrypts secrets with project-specific key encryption keys (pKEK), which are stored in the barbican database. These project-specific pKEKs are encrypted by a main key-encryption-key (KEK), which is stored in a hardware security module (HSM). All encryption and decryption operations take place in the HSM, rather than in-process memory. The PKCS#11 plugin communicates with the HSM through the PKCS#11 API. Because the encryption is done in secure hardware, and a different pKEK is used per project, this option is more secure than the simple crypto plugin.

Red Hat supports the PKCS#11 backend with any of the following HSMs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device</th>
<th>Supported in release</th>
<th>High Availability (HA) support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATOS Trustway Proteccio NetHSM</td>
<td>16.0+</td>
<td>16.1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrust nShield Connect HSM</td>
<td>16.0+</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thales Luna Network HSM</td>
<td>16.1 (Technology Preview)</td>
<td>16.1 (Technology Preview)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE**

Regarding high availability (HA) options: The barbican service runs within Apache and is configured by director to use HAProxy for high availability. HA options for the back end layer will depend on the back end being used. For example, for simple crypto, all the barbican instances have the same encryption key in the config file, resulting in a simple HA configuration.

### 1.2.1. Configuring multiple encryption mechanisms

You can configure a single instance of Barbican to use more than one backend. When this is done, you must specify a backend as the global default backend. You can also specify a default backend per project. If no mapping exists for a project, the secrets for that project are stored using the global default backend.

For example, you can configure Barbican to use both the Simple crypto and PKCS#11 plugins. If you set Simple crypto as the global default, then all projects will use that backend. You can then specify which projects use the PKCS#11 backend by setting PKCS#11 as the preferred backend for that project.

If you decide to migrate to a new backend, you can keep the original available while enabling the new backend as the global default or as a project-specific backend. As a result, the old secrets remain available through the old backend, and new secrets are stored in the new global default backend.

### 1.3. DEPLOYING KEY MANAGER
To deploy OpenStack Key Manager, first create an environment file for the barbican service and redeploy the overcloud with additional environment files. You then add users to the creator role to create and edit barbican secrets or to create encrypted volumes that store their secret in barbican.

NOTE

This procedure configures barbican to use the simple_crypto backend. Additional backends are available, such as PKCS#11 which requires a different configuration, and different heat template files depending on which HSM is used. Other backends such as KMIP, Hashicorp Vault and DogTag are not supported.

Prerequisites

- Overcloud is deployed and running
- Barbican container image is prepared and uploaded

Procedure

1. On the undercloud node, create an environment file for barbican.

   ```
   $ cat /home/stack/templates/configure-barbican.yaml
   parameter_defaults:
     BarbicanSimpleCryptoGlobalDefault: true
   
   The BarbicanSimpleCryptoGlobalDefault sets this plugin as the global default plugin.
   
   You can also add the following options to the environment file:
   
   - **BarbicanPassword** - Sets a password for the barbican service account.
   
   - **BarbicanWorkers** - Sets the number of workers for barbican::wsgi::apache. Uses '% {::processorcount}' by default.
   
   - **BarbicanDebug** - Enables debugging.
   
   - **BarbicanPolicies** - Defines policies to configure for barbican. Uses a hash value, for example: `{ barbican-context_is_admin: { key: context_is_admin, value: 'role:admin' } }`. This entry is then added to /etc/barbican/policy.json. Policies are described in detail in a later section.
   
   - **BarbicanSimpleCryptoKek** - The Key Encryption Key (KEK) is generated by director, if none is specified.

2. Add the following files to the openstack overcloud deploy command, without removing previously added role, template or environment files from the script:

   - /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/services/barbican.yaml
   
   - /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/barbican-backend-simple-crypto.yaml
   
   - /home/stack/templates/configure-barbican.yaml

3. Re-run the deployment script to apply changes to your deployment:
$ openstack overcloud deploy \
  --timeout 100 \
  --templates /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates \
  --stack overcloud \
  --libvirt-type kvm \
  --ntp-server clock.redhat.com \
  -e /home/stack/virt/config_lvm.yaml \
  -e /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/network-isolation.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/virt/network/network-environment.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/virt/hosts.yml \
  -e /home/stack/virt/nodes_data.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/virt/extra_templates.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/virt/container-parameters-with-barbican.yaml \
  -e /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/services/barbican.yaml \
  -e /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/services/barbican-backend-simple-crypto.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/configure-barbican.yaml \
  --log-file overcloud_deployment_38.log

4. Retrieve the id of the creator role:

openstack role show creator

+-----------+----------------------------------+
| Field     | Value                            |
+-----------+----------------------------------+
| domain_id | None                             |
| id        | 4e9c560c6f104608948450fbf316f9d7 |
| name      | creator                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------+

NOTE
You will not see the creator role unless OpenStack Key Manager (barbican) is installed.

5. Assign a user to the creator role and specify the relevant project. In this example, a user named user1 in the project_a project is added to the creator role:

openstack role add --user user1 --project project_a 4e9c560c6f104608948450fbf316f9d7

Verification

1. Create a test secret. For example:

$ openstack secret store --name testSecret --payload 'TestPayload'

+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Field         | Value                                                                              |
+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Secret href   | https://192.168.123.163/key-manager/v1/secrets/4cc5ffe0-eea2-449d-9e64-b664d574be53 |
| Name          | testSecret                                                                       |
| Created       | None                                                                               |
| Status        | None                                                                               |
1.4. VIEWING KEY MANAGER POLICIES

Barbican uses policies to determine which users are allowed to perform actions against the secrets, such as adding or deleting keys. To implement these controls, keystone project roles such as creator you created earlier, are mapped to barbican internal permissions. As a result, users assigned to those project roles receive the corresponding barbican permissions.

The default policy is defined in code and typically does not require any amendments. If policy changes have not been made, you can view the default policy using the existing container in your environment. If changes have been made to the default policy, and you would like to see the defaults, use a separate system to pull the openstack-barbican-api container first.

Prerequisites

- OpenStack Key Manager is deployed and running

Procedure

1. Use your Red Hat credentials to log in to podman:

   podman login
   username: ********
   password: ********

2. Pull the openstack-barbican-api container:

   podman pull \registry.redhat.io/rhosp-rhel8/openstack-barbican-api:16.2

3. Generate the policy file in the current working directory:

   podman run -it \registry.redhat.io/rhosp-rhel8/openstack-barbican-api:16.2 \oslopolicy-policy-generator \--namespace barbican > barbican-policy.yaml
Verification

Review the `barbican-policy.yaml` file to check the policies used by barbican. The policy is implemented by four different roles that define how a user interacts with secrets and secret metadata. A user receives these permissions by being assigned to a particular role:

- **admin** - Can delete, create/edit, and read secrets.
- **creator** - Can create/edit, and read secrets. Can not delete secrets.
- **observer** - Can only read data.
- **audit** - Can only read metadata. Can not read secrets.

For example, the following entries list the `admin`, `observer`, and `creator` keystone roles for each project. On the right, notice that they are assigned the **role:admin**, **role:observer**, and **role:creator** permissions:

```yaml
# "admin": "role:admin"
#
# "observer": "role:observer"
#
# "creator": "role:creator"
```

These roles can also be grouped together by barbican. For example, rules that specify **admin_or_creator** can apply to members of either **rule:admin** or **rule:creator**.

Further down in the file, there are `secret:put` and `secret:delete` actions. To their right, notice which roles have permissions to execute these actions. In the following example, `secret:delete` means that only `admin` and `creator` role members can delete secret entries. In addition, the rule states that users in the `admin` or `creator` role for that project can delete a secret in that project. The project match is defined by the **secret_project_match** rule, which is also defined in the policy.

```yaml
secret:delete": "rule:admin_or_creator and rule:secret_project_match"
```
CHAPTER 2. MANAGING SECRETS AND KEYS WITH OPENSTACK KEY MANAGER (BARBICAN)

You use OpenStack Key Manager to create, update, and delete secrets and encryption keys. You can also back up and restore the encryption keys and the barbican database. It is recommended that you regularly back up your encryption keys and barbican database.

2.1. VIEWING SECRETS

To view the list of secrets, run the openstack secret list command. The list includes the URI, name, type, and other information about the secrets.

Procedure

- View the list of secrets:

```
$ openstack secret list
```

```
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+------------------+
| Secret href                                                                        | Name | Created                   | Status
| Content types                             | Algorithm | Bit length | Secret type | Mode | Expiration |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+------------------+
| https://192.168.123.169:9311/v1/secrets/24845e6d-64a5-4071-ba99-0fdd1046172e | None | 2018-01-22T02:23:15+00:00 | ACTIVE | {u'default': u'application/octet-stream'} | aes | 256 | symmetric | None | None |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+------------------+
```

2.2. CREATING A SECRET

To create a secret, run the openstack secret store command and specify the name of the secret and optionally the payload for the secret.

Procedure

- Create a secret. For example:

```
$ openstack secret store --name testSecret --payload 'TestPayload'
```

```
+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Field         | Value                                                                              |
+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Secret href   | https://192.168.123.169:9311/v1/secrets/ecc7b2a4-f0b0-47ba-b451-0f7d42bc1746 |
| Name          | testSecret                                                                         |
| Created       | None                                                                               |
| Status        | None                                                                               |
| Content types | None                                                                               |
| Algorithm     | aes                                                                                |
| Bit length    | 256                                                                                |
+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
2.3. ADDING A PAYLOAD TO A SECRET

You cannot change the payload of a secret (other than deleting the secret), but if you created a secret without specifying a payload, you can later add a payload to it by using the `openstack secret update` command.

Procedure

- Add a payload to a secret:

  ```
  $ openstack secret update https://192.168.123.163:9311/v1/secrets/ca34a264-fd09-44a1-8856-c6e7116c3b16 'TestPayload-updated'
  $`
  ```

2.4. DELETING A SECRET

To delete a secret, run the `openstack secret delete` command and specify the secret URI.

Procedure

- Delete a secret with the specified URI:

  ```
  $ openstack secret delete https://192.168.123.163:9311/v1/secrets/ecc7b2a4-f0b0-47ba-b451-0f7d42bc1746
  $`
  ```

2.5. GENERATING A SYMMETRIC KEY

To generate a symmetric key, use the `order create` command and then store the key in barbican. You can then use symmetric keys for certain tasks, such as nova disk encryption and swift object encryption.

Prerequisites

- OpenStack Key Manager is installed and running

Procedure

1. Generate a new 256-bit key using `order create` and store it in barbican. For example:

  ```
  $ openstack secret order create --name swift_key --algorithm aes --mode ctr --bit-length 256 --payload-content-type=application/octet-stream key
  +----------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  | Field          | Value                                                                             |
  +----------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  | Order href     | https://192.168.123.173:9311/v1/orders/043383fe-d504-42cf-a9b1-bc328d0b4832          |
  | Type           | Key                                                                               |
  ```
You can also use the --mode option to configure generated keys to use a particular mode, such as **ctr** or **cbc**. For more information, see *NIST SP 800-38A*.

2. View the details of the order to identify the location of the generated key, shown here as the **Secret href** value:

```
$ openstack secret order get https://192.168.123.173:9311/v1/orders/043383fe-d504-42cf-a9b1-bc328d0b4832
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Order href</td>
<td><a href="https://192.168.123.173:9311/v1/orders/043383fe-d504-42cf-a9b1-bc328d0b4832">https://192.168.123.173:9311/v1/orders/043383fe-d504-42cf-a9b1-bc328d0b4832</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container href</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created</td>
<td>2018-01-24T04:24:33+00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>ACTIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error code</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error message</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Retrieve the details of the secret:

```
$ openstack secret get https://192.168.123.173:9311/v1/secrets/efcfec49-b9a3-4425-a9b6-5ba69cb18719
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>swift_key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created</td>
<td>2018-01-24T04:24:33+00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>ACTIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content types</td>
<td>{u'default': u'application/octet-stream'}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm</td>
<td>aes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit length</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret type</td>
<td>symmetric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>ctr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expiration</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### 2.6. BACKING UP SIMPLE CRYPTO ENCRYPTION KEYS

To backup simple crypto encryption keys, back up the **barbican.conf** file that contains the main KEK to a security hardened location, and then back up the barbican database.
**IMPORTANT**

The procedure includes steps to generate a test secret and key. If you already generated a key for your secrets, skip the test key steps and use the key that you generated.

**Prerequisites**

- OpenStack Key Manager is installed and running
- You have a security hardened location for the KEK backup

**Procedure**

1. On the overcloud, generate a new 256-bit key and store it in barbican:

   ```
   (overcloud) [stack@undercloud-0 ~]$ openstack secret order create --name swift_key --algorithm aes --mode ctr --bit-length 256 --payload-content-type=application/octet-stream key
   +----------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
   | Field          | Value                                                                 |
   +----------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
   | Order href     | http://10.0.0.104:9311/v1/orders/2a11584d-851c-4bc2-83b7-35d04d3bae86 |
   | Type           | Key                                                                   |
   | Container href | N/A                                                                   |
   | Secret href    | None                                                                  |
   | Created        | None                                                                  |
   | Status         | None                                                                  |
   | Error code     | None                                                                  |
   | Error message  | None                                                                  |
   +----------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
   ```

2. Create a test secret:

   ```
   (overcloud) [stack@undercloud-0 ~]$ openstack secret store --name testSecret --payload 'TestPayload'
   +---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   | Field         | Value                                                                  |
   +---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   | Secret href   | http://10.0.0.104:9311/v1/secrets/93f62cfd-e008-401f-be74-bf057c88b04a |
   | Name          | testSecret                                                             |
   | Created       | None                                                                   |
   | Status        | None                                                                   |
   | Content types | None                                                                   |
   | Algorithm     | aes                                                                    |
   | Bit length    | 256                                                                    |
   | Secret type   | opaque                                                                 |
   | Mode          | cbc                                                                    |
   | Expiration    | None                                                                   |
   +---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   ```

3. Confirm that the test secret is created:

   ```
   (overcloud) [stack@undercloud-0 ~]$ openstack secret list
   +-----------------+---------------+------------------------+-------------+------------------------+------------------------+-------------+------------------------+---------------+
   | Order href      | Type          | Container href         | Secret href | Name                   | Created                | Status       | Content types | Algorithm       | Bit length | Secret type | Mode | Expiration |               |
   +-----------------+---------------+------------------------+------------------------+------------------------+------------------------+-------------+------------------------+---------------+
   | http://10.0.0.104:9311/v1/orders/2a11584d-851c-4bc2-83b7-35d04d3bae86 | Key | N/A | None | | | | | | |
   | | | | | | | | | | |
   | http://10.0.0.104:9311/v1/secrets/93f62cfd-e008-401f-be74-bf057c88b04a | Key | N/A | None | testSecret | | | | | |
   | | | | | | | | | | |
   ```
### 4. Copy the `barbican.conf` file that contains the main KEK to a security hardened location.

### 5. Log in to the **controller-0** node and retrieve `barbican` user password:

   ```bash
   [heat-admin@controller-0 ~]$ sudo grep -r "barbican::db::mysql::password" /etc/puppet/hieradata
   /etc/puppet/hieradata/service_configs.json: "barbican::db::mysql::password": "seDJRsMNRrBdFryCmNUEFPgve",
   ```

**NOTE**

*Only the user `barbican` has access to the `barbican` database. So the barbican user password is required to backup or restore the database.*

### 6. Back up the `barbican` database:

   ```bash
   [heat-admin@controller-0 ~]$ mysqldump -u barbican -p"seDJRsMNRrBdFryCmNUEFPgve" barbican > barbican_db_backup.sql
   ```

### 7. Check that the database backup is stored in `/home/heat-admin`:

   ```bash
   [heat-admin@controller-0 ~]$ ll
   total 36
   -rw-rw-r--. 1 heat-admin heat-admin 36715 Jun 19 18:31 barbican_db_backup.sql
   ```

### 8. On the overcloud, delete the secrets you created previously and verify that they no longer exist:

   ```bash
   (overcloud) [stack@undercloud-0 ~]$ openstack secret delete
   http://10.0.0.104:9311/v1/secrets/93f62cfd-e008-401f-be74-bf057c88b04a
   (overcloud) [stack@undercloud-0 ~]$ openstack secret delete
   http://10.0.0.104:9311/v1/secrets/f664b5cf-5221-47e5-9887-608972a5febf
   (overcloud) [stack@undercloud-0 ~]$ openstack secret list
   ```

### 2.7. RESTORING SIMPLE CRYPTO ENCRYPTION KEYS FROM A BACKUP
To restore the barbican database from a backup, log in to the Controller node with barbican permissions and restore the barbican database. To restore the KEK from a backup, override the barbican.conf file with the backup file.

Prerequisites

- OpenStack Key Manager is installed and running
- You have an existing backup of the barbican.conf file and the barbican database

Procedure

1. Log in to the controller-0 node and check that you have the barbican database on the controller that grants access to the barbican user to restore the database:

   [heat-admin@controller-0 ~]$ mysql -u barbican -p"seDJRsMNRrBdFryCmNUEFPPev"
   Welcome to the MariaDB monitor. Commands end with ; or 'g'.
   Your MariaDB connection id is 3799
   Server version: 10.1.20-MariaDB MariaDB Server

   Copyright (c) 2000, 2016, Oracle, MariaDB Corporation Ab and others.

   Type 'help;' or 'h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.

   MariaDB [(none)]> SHOW DATABASES;
   +---------------------------+
   | Database                  |
   +---------------------------+
   | barbican                  |
   | information_schema        |
   +---------------------------+
   2 rows in set (0.00 sec)

   MariaDB [(none)]> exit
   Bye
   [heat-admin@controller-0 ~]$

2. Restore the backup file to the barbican database:

   [heat-admin@controller-0 ~]$ sudo mysql -u barbican -p"seDJRsMNRrBdFryCmNUEFPPev"
   barbican < barbican_db_backup.sql
   [heat-admin@controller-0 ~]$

3. Override the barbican.conf file with the file that you previously backed up.

Verification

- On the overcloud, verify that the test secrets were restored successfully:

   (overcloud) [stack@undercloud-0 ~]$ openstack secret list
   +------------------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+------------+-------------+------+------
   | Secret href          | Name        | Created                  | Status |
   | Content types        | Algorithm | Bit length | Secret type | Mode | Expiration |
   +------------------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+------------+-------------+------+------
| http://10.0.0.104:9311/v1/secrets/93f62cfd-e008-401f-be74-bf057c88b04a | testSecret | 2018-06-19T18:25:25+00:00 | ACTIVE | {u'default': u'text/plain'} | aes | 256 | opaque | cbc | None |
| http://10.0.0.104:9311/v1/secrets/f664b5cf-5221-47e5-9887-608972a5fefb | swift_key | 2018-06-19T18:24:40+00:00 | ACTIVE | {u'default': u'application/octet-stream'} | aes | 256 | symmetric | ctr | None |
CHAPTER 3. INTEGRATING OPENSTACK KEY MANAGER (BARBICAN) WITH HARDWARE SECURITY MODULE (HSM) APPLIANCES

Integrate your Red Hat OpenStack Platform deployment with hardware security module (HSM) appliances to increase your security posture by using hardware based cryptographic processing. When you plan your OpenStack Key Manager integration with an HSM appliance, you must choose a supported encryption type and HSM appliance, set up regular backups, and review any other information or limitations that might affect your deployment.

3.1. INTEGRATING OPENSTACK KEY MANAGER (BARBICAN) WITH AN ATOS HSM

To integrate the PKCS#11 back end with your Trustway Proteccio Net HSM appliance, create a configuration file with the parameters to connect barbican with the HSM. You can enable HA by listing two or more HSMs below the atos_hsms parameter.

Planning

By default, the HSM can have a maximum of 32 concurrent connections. If you exceed this number, you might experience a memory error from the PKCS#11 client. You can calculate the number of connections as follows:

- Each Controller has one barbican-api and one barbican-worker process.
- Each Barbican API process is executed with N Apache workers - (where N defaults to the number of CPUs).
- Each worker has one connection to the HSM.

Each barbican-worker process has one connection to the database. You can use the BarbicanWorkers heat parameter to define the number of Apache workers for each API process. By default, the number of Apache workers matches the CPU count.

For example, if you have three Controllers, each with 32 cores, then the Barbican API on each Controller uses 32 Apache workers. Consequently, one Controller consumes all 32 HSM connections available. To avoid this contention, limit the number of Barbican Apache workers configured for each node. In this example, set BarbicanWorkers to 10 so that all three Controllers can make ten concurrent connections each to the HSM.

Prerequisites

- A password-protected HTTPS server that provides vendor software for the Atos HSM

Table 3.1. Files provided by the HTTPS server

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Provided by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proteccio Client Software ISO image file</td>
<td>Proteccio1.09.05.iso</td>
<td>HSM Vendor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSL server certificate</td>
<td>proteccio.CRT</td>
<td>HSM administrator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Procedure

1. Create a `configure-barbican.yaml` environment file for Barbican and add the following parameters:

```yaml
parameter_defaults
  BarbicanSimpleCryptoGlobalDefault: false
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoGlobalDefault: true
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoLogin: ********
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoSlotId: 1

ATOSVars:
  atos_client_iso_name: Proteccio1.09.05.iso
  atos_client_iso_location: https://user@PASSWORD:example.com/Proteccio1.09.05.iso
  atos_client_cert_location: https://user@PASSWORD:example.com/client.CRT
  atos_client_key_location: https://user@PASSWORD:example.com/client.KEY

atos_hsms:
  - name: myHsm1
    server_cert_location: https://user@PASSWORD:example.com/myHsm1.CRT
    ip: 192.168.1.101
  - name: myHsm2
    server_cert_location: https://user@PASSWORD:example.com/myHsm2.CRT
    ip: 192.168.1.102
```

**NOTE**

The `atos_hsms` parameter supersedes the parameters `atos_hsm_ip_address` and `atos_server_cert_location` which have been deprecated and will be removed in a future release.

### Table 3.2. Heat parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanSimpleCryptoGlobalDefault</td>
<td>This is a boolean that determines if <code>simplecrypto</code> will be the global default.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanPkcs11GlobalDefault</td>
<td>This is a boolean that determines if <code>PKCS#11</code> will be the global default.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanPkcs11CryptoSlotId</td>
<td>Slot ID for the Virtual HSM to be used by Barbican.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATOSVars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameter</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atos_client_iso_name</td>
<td>The filename for the Atos client software ISO. This value must match the filename in the URL for the <code>atos_client_iso_location</code> parameter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atos_client_iso_location</td>
<td>The URL, including the username and password, that specifies the HTTPS server location of the Proteccio Client Software ISO image.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atos_client_cert_location</td>
<td>The URL, including the username and password, that specifies the HTTPS server location of the SSL client certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atos_client_key_location</td>
<td>The URL, including the username and password, that specifies the HTTPS server location of the SSL client key. This must be the matching key for the client certificate above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atos_hsms</td>
<td>A list of one or more HSMs that specifies the name, certificate location and IP address of the HSM. When you include more than one HSM in this list, Barbican configures the HSMs for load balancing and high availability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Include the custom `configure-barbican.yaml`, `barbican.yaml` and ATOS specific `barbican-backend-pkcs11-atos.yaml` environment files in the deployment command, as well as any other environment files relevant to your deployment:

```
```

**Verification**

1. Create a test secret:
$ openstack secret store --name testSecret --payload "TestPayload"

+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Field         | Value                                                                              |
+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Secret href   | https://192.168.123.163/key-manager/v1/secrets/4cc5ffe0-eea2-449d-9e64-b664d574be53 |
| Name          | testSecret                                                                         |
| Created       | None                                                                               |
| Status        | None                                                                               |
| Content types | None                                                                               |
| Algorithm     | aes                                                                                 |
| Bit length    | 256                                                                                |
| Secret type   | opaque                                                                             |
| Mode          | cbc                                                                                 |
| Expiration    | None                                                                               |
+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

2. Retrieve the payload for the secret that you just created:

openstack secret get https://192.168.123.163/key-manager/v1/secrets/4cc5ffe0-eea2-449d-9e64-b664d574be53 --payload

+---------+-------------+
| Field   | Value       |
+---------+-------------+
| Payload | TestPayload |
+---------+-------------+

3.2. INTEGRATING OPENSTACK KEY MANAGER (BARBICAN) WITH A THALES LUNA NETWORK HSM

To integrate the PKCS#11 backend with your Thales Luna Network HSM appliance for hardware based cryptographic processing, use an Ansible role to download and install the Thales Luna client software on the Controller, and create a Key Manager configuration file to include the predefined HSM IP and credentials.

Prerequisites

- A password-protected HTTPS server that provides vendor software for the Thales Luna Network HSM.
- The vendor provided Luna Network HSM client software in a compressed zip archive.

Procedure

1. Install the `ansible-role-lunasa-hsm` role on the director:

   sudo dnf install ansible-role-lunasa-hsm

2. Create a `configure-barbican.yaml` environment file for Key Manager (barbican) and add parameters specific to your environment.

   parameter_defaults:
   BarbicanPkcs11CryptoMKEKLabel: "barbican_mkek_0"
BarbicanPkcs11CryptoHMACLabel: "barbican_hmac_0"
BarbicanPkcs11CryptoLogin: "$PKCS_11_USER_PIN"
BarbicanPkcs11CryptoGlobalDefault: true

LunasaVars:
  lunasa_client_tarball_name: 610-012382-014_SW_Client_HSM_6.2_RevA.tar.zip
  lunasa_client_tarball_location: https://user:$PASSWORD@http-server.example.com/luna_software/610-012382-014_SW_Client_HSM_6.2_RevA.tar.zip
  lunasa_client_installer_path: 610-012382-014_SW_Client_HSM_6.2_RevA/linux/64/install.sh
  lunasa_hsms:
    - hostname: luna-hsm.example.com
      admin_password: "$HSM_ADMIN_PASSWORD"
      partition: myPartition1
      partition_serial: 123456789

Table 3.3. Heat parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanSimpleCryptoGlobalDefault</td>
<td>This is a boolean that determines if simplecrypto will be the global default.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanPkcs11GlobalDefault</td>
<td>This is a boolean that determines if PKCS#11 will be the global default.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanPkcs11CryptoTokenLabel</td>
<td>If you have one HSM, then the value of the parameter will be the partition Label. If you are using HA between two or more partitions, then this is the label that you want to give to the HA group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanPkcs11CryptoLogin</td>
<td>The PKCS#11 password used to log into the HSM, provided by the HSM administrator.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LunasaVar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>lunasa_client_tarball_name</th>
<th>The name of the Luna software tarball.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lunasa_client_tarball_location</td>
<td>The URL that specifies the HTTPS server location of the Luna Software tarball.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lunasa_client_installer_path</td>
<td>Path to the install.sh script in the zipped tarball.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lunasa_client_rotate_cert</td>
<td>(Optional) When set to true, new client certificates will be generated to replace any existing certificates. Default: false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lunasa_client_working_dir</td>
<td>(Optional) Working directory in the Controller nodes. Default:/tmp/lunasa_client_install</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A list of one or more HSMs that specifies the name, hostname, admin_password, partition, and partition serial number. When you include more than one HSM in this list, Barbican configures the HSMs for high availability.

3. Include the custom `configure-barbican.yaml` and Thales specific `barbican-backend-pkcs11-lunasa.yaml` environment files in the deployment command, as well as any other templates relevant for your deployment:

```bash
$ openstack overcloud deploy --templates \
.... \
-e /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/services/barbican.yaml \
-e /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/barbican-backend-pkcs11-lunasa.yaml \
-e /home/stack/configure-barbican.yaml \
--log-file overcloud_deployment_with_luna.log
```

### 3.3. INTEGRATING OPENSTACK KEY MANAGER (BARBICAN) WITH AN ENTRUST NSHIELD CONNECT XC HSM

To integrate the PKCS#11 backend with your Entrust nShield Connect XC HSM, use an Ansible role to download and install the Entrust client software on the Controller, and create a Barbican configuration file to include the predefined HSM IP and credentials.

#### Prerequisites

- A password-protected HTTPS server that provides vendor software for the Entrust nShield Connect XC.

#### Procedure

1. Create a `configure-barbican.yaml` environment file for Barbican and add parameters specific to your environment. Use the following snippet as an example:

```yaml
parameter_defaults:
  VerifyGlanceSignatures: true
  SwiftEncryptionEnabled: true
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoLogin: 'sample string'
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoSlotId: '492971158'
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoGlobalDefault: true
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoLibraryPath: '/opt/nfast/toolkits/pkcs11/libcknfast.so'
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoEncryptionMechanism: 'CKM_AES_CBC'
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoHMACKeyType: 'CKK_SHA256_HMAC'
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoHMACKeygenMechanism: 'CKM_NC_SHA256_HMAC_KEY_GEN'
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoMKEKLabel: 'barbican_mkek_10'
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoMKEKLength: '32'
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoHMACLabel: 'barbican_hmac_10'
  BarbicanPkcs11CryptoThalesEnabled: true
```
BarbicanPkcs11CryptoEnabled: true
ThalesVars:
  thales_client_working_dir: /tmp/thales_client_install
  thales_client_tarball_location: https://your server/CipherTools-linux64-dev-12.40.2.tgz
  thales_client_tarball_name: CipherTools-linux64-dev-12.40.2.tgz
  thales_client_path: linux/libc6_11/amd64/nfast
  thales_client_uid: 42481
  thales_client_gid: 42481
  thales_km_data_location: https://your server/kmdata_post_card_creation.tar.gz
  thales_km_data_tarball_name: kmdata_post_card_creation.tar.gz
  thales_rfs_server_ip_address: 192.168.10.12
  thales_hsm_config_location: hsm-C90E-02E0-D947
nShield_hsms:
  - name: hsm-name.example.com
    ip: 192.168.10.10
  thales_rfs_user: root
  thales_rfs_key: |
      -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
      Sample private key
      -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

resource_registry:
  OS::TripleO::Services::BarbicanBackendPkcs11Crypto: /home/stack/tripleo-heat-templates/puppet/services/barbican-backend-pkcs11-crypto.yaml

Table 3.4. Heat parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanSimpleCryptoGlobalDefault</td>
<td>This is a boolean that determines if simplecrypto will be the global default.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanPkcs11GlobalDefault</td>
<td>This is a boolean that determines if PKCS#11 will be the global default.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanPkcs11CryptoSlotId</td>
<td>Slot ID for the Virtual HSM to be used by Barbican.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanPkcs11CryptoMKEKLabel</td>
<td>This parameter defines the name of the mKEK generated in the HSM. Director creates this key in the HSM using this name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarbicanPkcs11CryptoHMACLabel</td>
<td>This parameter defines the name of the HMAC key generated in the HSM. Director creates this key in the HSM using this name.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| ThalesVars
| thales_client_working_dir | A user-defined temporary working directory. |
| thales_client_tarball_location | The URL that specifies the HTTPS server location of the Entrust software. |
**Parameter** | **Value**
--- | ---
`thales_km_data_tarball_name` | The name of the Entrust software tarball.

`thales_rfs_key` | A private key used to obtain an SSH connection to the RFS server. You must add this as an authorized key to the RFS server.

2. Include the custom `configure-barbican.yaml` environment file, along with the `barbican.yaml` and Thales specific `barbican-backend-pkcs11-thales.yaml` environment files, and any other templates needed for your deployment when running the `openstack overcloud deploy` command:

```bash
$ openstack overcloud deploy \
  --timeout 100 \
  --templates /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates \
  --stack overcloud \
  --libvirt-type kvm \
  --ntp-server clock.redhat.com \
  -e /home/stack/virt/config_lvm.yaml \
  -e /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/network-isolation.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/virt/network/network-environment.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/virt/hostnames.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/virt/nodes_data.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/virt/extra_templates.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/container-parameters-with-barbican.yaml \
  -e /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/services/barbican.yaml \
  -e /usr/share/openstack-tripleo-heat-templates/environments/barbican-backend-pkcs11-thales.yaml \
  -e /home/stack/configure-barbican.yaml \
  --log-file overcloud_deployment_with_atos.log
```

**Verification**

1. Create a test secret:

```bash
$ openstack secret store --name testSecret --payload 'TestPayload'
```

+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret href</td>
<td><a href="https://192.168.123.163/key-manager/v1/secrets/4cc5ffe0-eea2-449d-9e64-b664d574be53">https://192.168.123.163/key-manager/v1/secrets/4cc5ffe0-eea2-449d-9e64-b664d574be53</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>testSecret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content types</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm</td>
<td>aes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit length</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret type</td>
<td>opaque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>cbc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expiration</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+---------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
2. Retrieve the payload for the secret that you just created:

```
openstack secret get https://192.168.123.163/key-manager/v1/secrets/4cc5ffe0-eea2-449d-9e64-b664d574be53 --payload
+---------+-------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Payload</td>
<td>TestPayload</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+---------+-------------+
```

### 3.3.1. Load Balancing with Entrust nShield Connect

You can now enable load sharing on Entrust nShield Connect HSMs by specifying an array of valid HSMs. When more than one HSMs are listed, load sharing is enabled.

This feature is available in this release as a Technology Preview, and therefore is not fully supported by Red Hat. It should only be used for testing, and should not be deployed in a production environment.

For more information about Technology Preview features, see [Scope of Coverage Details](#).

**Procedure**

- When configuring the `name` and `ip` parameters for your Entrust nShield Connect HSMs, specifying more than one will enable load sharing:

```
parameter_defaults:
....
ThalesVars:
....
nshield_hsms:
- name: hsm-name1.example.com
  ip: 192.168.10.10
- name: hsm-name2.example.com
  ip: 192.168.10.11
....
```

### 3.4. ROTATING MKEK AND HMAC KEYS

You can rotate the MKEK and HMAC keys using a director update.

**NOTE**

Due to a limitation in Barbican, the MKEK and HMAC have the same key type.

**Procedure**

1. Add the following parameter to your deployment environment files:

```
   BarbicanPkcs11CryptoRewrapKeys: true
```

2. Change the labels on the MKEK and HMAC keys For example, if your labels are similar to these:
BarbicanPkcs11CryptoMKEKLabel: 'barbican_mkek_10'
BarbicanPkcs11CryptoHMACLabel: 'barbican_hmac_10'

You can change the labels by incrementing the values:

BarbicanPkcs11CryptoMKEKLabel: 'barbican_mkek_11'
BarbicanPkcs11CryptoHMACLabel: 'barbican_hmac_11'

NOTE

Do not change the HMAC key type.

3. Re-deploy using director to apply the update. Director checks whether the keys that are labelled for the MKEK and HMAC exist, and then creates them. In addition, with the BarbicanPkcs11CryptoRewrapKeys parameter set to True, director calls barbican-manage hsm pkek_rewrap to rewrap all existing pKEKs.
CHAPTER 4. ENCRYPTING AND VALIDATING OPENSTACK SERVICES

You can use barbican to encrypt and validate several Red Hat OpenStack Platform services, such as Block Storage (cinder) encryption keys, Block Storage volume images, Object Storage (swift) objects, and Image Service (glance) images.

IMPORTANT

Nova formats encrypted volumes during their first use if they are unencrypted. The resulting block device is then presented to the Compute node.

Guidelines for containerized services

- Do not update any configuration file you might find on the physical node’s host operating system, for example, /etc/cinder/cinder.conf. The containerized service does not reference this file.

- Do not update the configuration file running within the container. Changes are lost once you restart the container. Instead, if you must change containerized services, update the configuration file in /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/, which is used to generate the container.

For example:

- keystone: /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/keystone.conf
- cinder: /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/cinder/etc/cinder/cinder.conf
- nova: /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/nova_libvirt/etc/nova/nova.conf

Changes are applied after you restart the container.

4.1. ENCRYPTING OBJECT STORAGE (SWIFT) AT-REST OBJECTS

By default, objects uploaded to Object Storage (swift) are stored unencrypted. Because of this, it is possible to access objects directly from the file system. This can present a security risk if disks are not properly erased before they are discarded. When you have barbican enabled, the Object Storage service (swift) can transparently encrypt and decrypt your stored (at-rest) objects. At-rest encryption is distinct from in-transit encryption in that it refers to the objects being encrypted while being stored on disk.

Swift performs these encryption tasks transparently, with the objects being automatically encrypted when uploaded to swift, then automatically decrypted when served to a user. This encryption and decryption is done using the same (symmetric) key, which is stored in barbican.

NOTE

You cannot disable encryption after you have enabled encryption and added data to the swift cluster, because the data is now stored in an encrypted state. Consequently, the data will not be readable if encryption is disabled, until you re-enable encryption with the same key.

Prerequisites
OpenStack Key Manager is installed and enabled

Procedure

1. Include the SwiftEncryptionEnabled: True parameter in your environment file, then re-running openstack overcloud deploy using /home/stack/overcloud_deploy.sh.

2. Confirm that swift is configured to use at-rest encryption:

   ```
   $ crudini --get /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/swift/etc/swift/proxy-server.conf pipeline-
   main pipeline
   pipeline = catch_errors healthcheck proxy-logging cache ratelimit bulk tempurl formpost
   authtoken keystone staticweb copy container_quotas account_quotas slo dlo
   versioned_writes kms_keymaster encryption proxy-logging proxy-server
   ```

   The result should include an entry for encryption.

4.2. ENCRYPTING BLOCK STORAGE (CINDER) VOLUMES

You can use barbican to manage your Block Storage (cinder) encryption keys. This configuration uses LUKS to encrypt the disks attached to your instances, including boot disks. Key management is transparent to the user; when you create a new volume using luks as the encryption type, cinder generates a symmetric key secret for the volume and stores it in barbican. When booting the instance (or attaching an encrypted volume), nova retrieves the key from barbican and stores the secret locally as a Libvirt secret on the Compute node.

Procedure

1. On nodes running the cinder-volume and nova-compute services, confirm that nova and cinder are both configured to use barbican for key management:

   ```
   $ crudini --get /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/cinder/etc/cinder/cinder.conf
   key_manager backend
   castellan.key_manager.barbican_key_manager.BarbicanKeyManager
   $ crudini --get /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/nova_libvirt/etc/nova/nova.conf
   key_manager backend
   castellan.key_manager.barbican_key_manager.BarbicanKeyManager
   ```

2. Create a volume template that uses encryption. When you create new volumes they can be modeled off the settings you define here:

   ```
   $ openstack volume type create --encryption-provider
   nova.volume.encryptors.luks.LuksEncryptor --encryption-cipher aes-xts-plain64 --encryption-
   key-size 256 --encryption-control-location front-end LuksEncryptor-Template-256
   +-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   | Field       | Value                                                                                           |
   +-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   | description | None                                                                                           |
   ```
3. Create a new volume and specify that it uses the **LuksEncryptor-Template-256** settings:

```bash
$ openstack volume create --size 1 --type LuksEncryptor-Template-256 'Encrypted-Test-Volume'
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attachments</td>
<td>[]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>availability_zone</td>
<td>nova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bootable</td>
<td>false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consistencygroup_id</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>created_at</td>
<td>2018-01-22T00:19:06.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>description</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encrypted</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>id</td>
<td>a361fd0b-882a-46cc-a669-c633630b5c93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>migration_status</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiattach</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>name</td>
<td>Encrypted-Test-Volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>properties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>replication_status</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>snapshot_id</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>source_volid</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status</td>
<td>creating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type</td>
<td>LuksEncryptor-Template-256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>updated_at</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>user_id</td>
<td>0e73cb3111614365a144e7f8f1a972af</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The resulting secret is automatically uploaded to the barbican backend.

**NOTE**

Ensure that the user creating the encrypted volume has the **creator** barbican role on the project. For more information, see the **Grant user access to the creator role** section.

4. Use barbican to confirm that the disk encryption key is present. In this example, the timestamp matches the LUKS volume creation time:

```bash
$ openstack secret list
```

---

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5. Attach the new volume to an existing instance. For example:

```bash
$ openstack server add volume testInstance Encrypted-Test-Volume
```

The volume is then presented to the guest operating system and can be mounted using the built-in tools.

### 4.2.1. Migrating Block Storage volumes to OpenStack Key Manager

If you previously used ConfKeyManager to manage disk encryption keys, you can migrate the volumes to OpenStack Key Manager by scanning the databases for encryption_key_id entries within scope for migration to barbican. Each entry gets a new barbican key ID and the existing ConfKeyManager secret is retained.

**NOTE**

- Previously, you could reassign ownership for volumes encrypted using ConfKeyManager. This is not possible for volumes that have their keys managed by barbican.
- Activating barbican will not break your existing keymgr volumes.

**Prerequisites**

Before you migrate, review the following differences between Barbican-managed encrypted volumes and volumes that use ConfKeyManager:

- You cannot transfer ownership of encrypted volumes, because it is not currently possible to transfer ownership of the barbican secret.
- Barbican is more restrictive about who is allowed to read and delete secrets, which can affect some cinder volume operations. For example, a user cannot attach, detach, or delete a different user’s volumes.

**Procedure**

1. Deploy the barbican service.

2. Add the creator role to the cinder service. For example:

   ```bash
   #openstack role create creator
   #openstack role add --user cinder creator --project service
   ```
3. Restart the `cinder-volume` and `cinder-backup` services. The `cinder-volume` and `cinder-backup` services automatically begin the migration process. You can check the log files to view status information about the migration:

- `cinder-volume` - migrates keys stored in cinder’s Volumes and Snapshots tables.
- `cinder-backup` - migrates keys in the Backups table.

4. Monitor the logs for the message indicating migration has finished and check that no more volumes are using the `ConfKeyManager` all-zeros encryption key ID.

5. Remove the `fixed_key` option from `cinder.conf` and `nova.conf`. You must determine which nodes have this setting configured.

6. Remove the `creator` role from the cinder service.

Verification

- After you start the process, one of these entries appears in the log files. This indicates whether the migration started correctly, or it identifies the issue it encountered:
  - **Not migrating encryption keys because the ConfKeyManager is still in use.**
  - **Not migrating encryption keys because the ConfKeyManager’s fixed_key is not in use.**
  - **Not migrating encryption keys because migration to the 'XXX' key_manager backend is not supported.** - This message is unlikely to appear; it is a safety check to handle the code ever encountering another Key Manager backend other than barbican. This is because the code only supports one migration scenario: From ConfKeyManager to barbican.
  - **Not migrating encryption keys because there are no volumes associated with this host.** - This may occur when `cinder-volume` is running on multiple hosts, and a particular host has no volumes associated with it. This arises because every host is responsible for handling its own volumes.
  - **Starting migration of ConfKeyManager keys.**
  - **Migrating volume <UUID> encryption key to Barbican** - During migration, all of the host’s volumes are examined, and if a volume is still using the ConfKeyManager’s key ID (identified by the fact that it’s all zeros `00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000`), then this message appears.
    - For `cinder-backup`, this message uses slightly different capitalization: Migrating Volume [...] or Migrating Backup [...]
  - After each host examines all of its volumes, the host displays a summary status message:
    ```
    'No volumes are using the ConfKeyManager’s encryption_key_id.'
    'No backups are known to be using the ConfKeyManager’s encryption_key_id.'
    ```
  - You may also see the following entries:
    - **There are still %d volume(s) using the ConfKeyManager’s all-zeros encryption key ID.**
    - **There are still %d backup(s) using the ConfKeyManager’s all-zeros encryption key ID.**
      Both of these messages can appear in the `cinder-volume` and `cinder-backup` logs.
Whereas each service only handles the migration of its own entries, the service is aware of the other’s status. As a result, `cinder-volume` knows if `cinder-backup` still has backups to migrate, and `cinder-backup` knows if the `cinder-volume` service has volumes to migrate.

Although each host migrates only its own volumes, the summary message is based on a global assessment of whether any volume still requires migration. This allows you to confirm that migration for all volumes is complete.

**Cleanup**

After migrating your key IDs into barbican, the fixed key remains in the configuration files. This may present a security concern to some users, because the `fixed_key` value is not encrypted in the `.conf` files.

To address this, you can manually remove the `fixed_key` values from your nova and cinder configurations. However, first complete testing and review the output of the log file before you proceed, because disks that are still dependent on this value will not be accessible.

**IMPORTANT**

The `encryption_key_id` was only recently added to the `Backup` table, as part of the Queens release. As a result, pre-existing backups of encrypted volumes are likely to exist. The all-zeros `encryption_key_id` is stored on the backup itself, but it won’t appear in the `Backup` database. As such, it is impossible for the migration process to know for certain whether a backup of an encrypted volume exists that still relies on the all-zeros `ConfKeyMgr` key ID.

1. Review the existing `fixed_key` values. The values must match for both services.

   ```
   crudini --get /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/cinder/etc/cinder/cinder.conf keymgr fixed_key
   crudini --get /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/nova_libvirt/etc/nova/nova.conf keymgr fixed_key
   ```

   **IMPORTANT**

   Make a backup of the existing `fixed_key` values. This allows you to restore the value if something goes wrong, or if you need to restore a backup that uses the old encryption key.

2. Delete the `fixed_key` values:

   ```
   crudini --del /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/cinder/etc/cinder/cinder.conf keymgr fixed_key
   crudini --del /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/nova_libvirt/etc/nova/nova.conf keymgr fixed_key
   ```

**Troubleshooting**

The barbican secret can only be created when the requestor has the `creator` role. This means that the cinder service itself requires the creator role, otherwise a log sequence similar to this will occur:

1. **Starting migration of ConfKeyManager keys.**
2. **Migrating volume <UUID> encryption key to Barbican**
3. Error migrating encryption key: Forbidden: Secret creation attempt not allowed - please review your user/project privileges

4. There are still %d volume(s) using the ConfKeyManager's all-zeros encryption key ID.

The key message is the third one: Secret creation attempt not allowed. To fix the problem, update the cinder account’s privileges:

1. Run `openstack role add --project service --user cinder creator`
2. Restart the `cinder-volume` and `cinder-backup` services.

As a result, the next attempt at migration should succeed.

### 4.3. VALIDATING BLOCK STORAGE (CINDER) VOLUME IMAGES

The Block Storage Service (cinder) automatically validates the signature of any downloaded, signed image during volume from image creation. The signature is validated before the image is written to the volume. To improve performance, you can use the Block Storage Image-Volume cache to store validated images for creating new volumes.

**NOTE**

Cinder image signature validation is not supported with Red Hat Ceph Storage or RBD volumes.

**Procedure**

1. Log in to a Controller node.

2. Choose one of the following options:
   - View cinder’s image validation activities in the Volume log, `/var/log/containers/cinder/cinder-volume.log`. For example, you can expect the following entry when the instance is booted:

   ```
   2018-05-24 12:48:35.256 1 INFO cinder.image.image_utils [req-7c271904-4975-4771-9d26-cbea6c0ade31 b464b2fd2a2140e9a88bbdacf67bddd8c a3db2f2beae454182c95b646fa7331f - default default] Image signature verification succeeded for image d3396fa0-2ea2-4832-8a77-d36fa3f2ab27
   ```
   
   - Use the `openstack volume list` and `cinder volume show` commands:
     a. Use the `openstack volume list` command to locate the volume ID.
     b. Run the `cinder volume show` command on a compute node:

       ```
       cinder volume show <VOLUME_ID>
       ```

3. Locate the `volume_image_metadata` section with the line `signature verified : True`.

   ```
   $ cinder show d0db26bb-449d-4111-a59a-6fbb080bb483
   +--------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | Property                       | Value                                           |
   +--------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
   ```
### NOTE

Snapshots are saved as Image service (glance) images. If you configure the Compute service (nova) to check for signed images, then you must manually download the image from glance, sign the image, and then re-upload the image. This is true whether the snapshot is from an instance created with signed images, or an instance booted from a volume created from a signed image.

### NOTE

A volume can be uploaded as an Image service (glance) image. If the original volume was bootable, the image can be used to create a bootable volume in the Block Storage service (cinder). If you have configured the Block Storage service to check for signed images then you must manually download the image from glance, compute the image signature and update all appropriate image signature properties before using the image. For more information, see Section 4.5, “Validating snapshots”.

### Additional resources
4.3.1. Automatic deletion of volume image encryption key

The Block Storage service (cinder) creates an encryption key in the Key Management service (barbican) when it uploads an encrypted volume to the Image service (glance). This creates a 1:1 relationship between an encryption key and a stored image.

Encryption key deletion prevents unlimited resource consumption of the Key Management service. The Block Storage, Key Management, and Image services automatically manage the key for an encrypted volume, including the deletion of the key.

The Block Storage service automatically adds two properties to a volume image:

- **cinder_encryption_key_id** - The identifier of the encryption key that the Key Management service stores for a specific image.
- **cinder_encryption_key_deletion_policy** - The policy that tells the Image service to tell the Key Management service whether to delete the key associated with this image.

**IMPORTANT**

The values of these properties are automatically assigned. To avoid unintentional data loss, do not adjust these values.

When you create a volume image, the Block Storage service sets the **cinder_encryption_key_deletion_policy** property to **on_image_deletion**. When you delete a volume image, the Image service deletes the corresponding encryption key if the **cinder_encryption_key_deletion_policy** equals **on_image_deletion**.

**IMPORTANT**

Red Hat does not recommend manual manipulation of the **cinder_encryption_key_id** or **cinder_encryption_key_deletion_policy** properties. If you use the encryption key that is identified by the value of **cinder_encryption_key_id** for any other purpose, you risk data loss.

4.4. VALIDATING IMAGE SERVICE (GLANCE) IMAGES

To configure the Image Service (glance) to verify that an uploaded image has not been tampered with, you use the **openssl** command to sign the image with a key that is stored in barbican. You then upload the image to glance with the accompanying signing information. As a result, the image’s signature is verified before each use, with the instance build process failing if the signature does not match.

**Prerequisites**

- OpenStack Key Manager is installed and enabled

**Procedure**

1. In your environment file, enable image verification with the **VerifyGlanceSignatures**: **True** setting. You must re-run the **openstack overcloud deploy** command for this setting to take effect.
To verify that glance image validation is enabled, run the following command on an overcloud Compute node:

```
$ sudo crudini --get /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/nova_libvirt/etc/nova/nova.conf glance verify_glance_signatures
```

**NOTE**

If you use Ceph as the back end for the Image and Compute services, a CoW clone is created. Therefore, Image signing verification cannot be performed.

3. Confirm that glance is configured to use barbican:

```
$ sudo crudini --get /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/glance_api/etc/glance/glance-api.conf key_manager backend
castellan.key_manager.barbican_key_manager.BarbicanKeyManager
```

4. Generate a private key and convert it to the required format:

```
openssl genrsa -out private_key.pem 1024
openssl rsa -pubout -in private_key.pem -out public_key.pem
openssl req -new -key private_key.pem -out cert_request.csr
openssl x509 -req -days 14 -in cert_request.csr -signkey private_key.pem -out
x509_signing_cert.crt
```

5. Add the key to the barbican secret store:

```
$ source ~/overcloudrc
$ openstack secret store --name signing-cert --algorithm RSA --secret-type certificate --
payload-content-type "application/octet-stream" --payload-content-encoding base64 --
payload "$(base64 x509_signing_cert.crt)" -c 'Secret href' -f value
https://192.168.123.170:9311/v1/secrets/5df14c2b-f221-4a02-948e-48a61edd3f5b
```

**NOTE**

Record the resulting UUID for use in a later step. In this example, the certificate’s UUID is **5df14c2b-f221-4a02-948e-48a61edd3f5b**.

6. Use `private_key.pem` to sign the image and generate the `.signature` file. For example:

```
$ openssl dgst -sha256 -sign private_key.pem -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -out cirros-0.4.0.signature cirros-0.4.0-x86_64-disk.img
```

7. Convert the resulting `.signature` file into `base64` format:

```
$ base64 -w 0 cirros-0.4.0.signature > cirros-0.4.0.signature.b64
```

8. Load the `base64` value into a variable to use it in the subsequent command:

```
$ cirros_signature_b64=$(cat cirros-0.4.0.signature.b64)
```
9. Upload the signed image to glance. For `img_signature_certificate_uuid`, you must specify the UUID of the signing key you previously uploaded to barbican:

```
openstack image create
  --container-format bare --disk-format qcow2
  --property img_signature="$cirros_signature_b64"
  --property img_signature_certificate_uuid="5df14c2b-f221-4a02-948e-48a61edd3f5b"
  --property img_signature_hash_method="SHA-256"
  --property img_signature_key_type="RSA-PSS" cirros_0_4_0_signed
  --file cirros-0.4.0-x86_64-disk.img
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>checksum</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>container_format</td>
<td>bare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>created_at</td>
<td>2018-01-23T05:37:31Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disk_format</td>
<td>qcow2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>id</td>
<td>d3396fa0-2ea2-4832-8a77-d36fa3f2ab27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>img_signature</td>
<td>lcI7nGoKxnCyOcsJ4abbEZEpzXByFPiPcPxi7q+Otjz0yvwW00KNN3f0AA6tn9EXrp7fb2xBDE4UaO3v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IFquV/s3mU4LcGdBA13pGsMmZlQFVNCuoayS1kQYKY7kxYmU9iq/ASYyPW37KQi52sWc/zoO54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>zZ+JpnfwIsM=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>img_signature_certificate_uuid</td>
<td>ba3641c2-6a3d-445a-8543-851a68110eb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>img_signature_hash_method</td>
<td>SHA-256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>img_signature_key_type</td>
<td>RSA-PSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min_disk</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min_ram</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>name</td>
<td>cirros_0_4_0_signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>owner</td>
<td>9f812310df904e6ea01e1bacb84c9f1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protected</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>tags</td>
<td>[]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>updated_at</td>
<td>2018-01-23T05:37:31Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>virtual_size</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visibility</td>
<td>shared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. You can view glance’s image validation activities in the Compute log: `/var/log/containers/nova/nova-compute.log`. For example, you can expect the following entry when the instance is booted:

```
2018-05-24 12:48:35.256 1 INFO nova.image.glance [req-7c271904-4975-4771-9d26-cbea6c0ade31 b464b2fd2a2140e9a88bbdacf67bdd8c a3db2f2beaee454182c95b646fa7331f - default default] Image signature verification succeeded for image d3396fa0-2ea2-4832-8a77-d36fa3f2ab27
```
4.5. VALIDATING SNAPSHOTS

Snapshots are saved as Image service (glance) images. If you configure the Compute service (nova) to check for signed images, then snapshots must be signed, even if they were created from an instance with a signed image.

Procedure

1. Download the snapshot from glance

   ```bash
   openstack image save --file <local-file-name> <image-name>
   ```

2. Generate a signature to validate the snapshot. This is the same process you use when you generate a signature to validate any image. For more information, see Validating Image Service (glance) images.

3. Update the image properties:

   ```bash
   openstack image set \
   --property img_signature=\"cirros_signature_b64\" \
   --property img_signature_certificate_uuid=\"5df14c2b-f221-4a02-948e-48a61edd3f5b\" \
   --property img_signature_hash_method=\"SHA-256\" \
   --property img_signature_key_type=\"RSA-PSS\" \
   <image_id_of_the_snapshot>
   ```

4. Optional: Remove the downloaded glance image from the filesystem:

   ```bash
   rm <local-file-name>
   ```